Richer but Resented: What do Cash Transfers do to Social Relations? by MacAuslan, Ian & Riemenschneider, Nils
1 Introduction
Cash transfer interventions form increasingly
important parts of social protection systems in
most countries. Following the cash benefits
systems prevalent in most industrialised
countries, many low- and middle-income
countries have independently developed and
implemented national cash transfer systems to
provide social protection to vulnerable groups,
such as older persons or families with children.
At the same time, many donor agencies,
international organisations and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) are funding cash transfer
projects, with or without extensive government
buy-in. These projects are usually of two types:
parts of emergency responses (such as the
Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer programme)
or pilot projects designed to encourage
governments to develop national cash transfer
programmes (such as the Hunger Safety Net
Programme in Kenya or the Mchinji Social Cash
Transfer Scheme in Malawi). Both donor-funded
and nationally run projects have been extensively
evaluated, with largely positive results, leading to
ever greater enthusiasm for and emphasis on
cash transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010). This article
argues that additional considerations, especially
with respect to social relations, should be taken
into account in assessing cash transfers.
Usually, cash transfers are evaluated principally
against their first order effects on recipients’ and
non-recipients’ consumption expenditure,
income, nutrition, human capital (health and
education) and labour supply. These effects can
be called ‘material impacts’. Some attention is
also given to second order economic impacts,
such as inflationary effects or economic
multipliers (Davies and Davey 2008). These
impacts are typically most interesting to donors
and governments, possibly because they have the
clearest links to economic growth. They are also
relatively straightforward to measure with
surveys. Generally, where markets are functional
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It is quite possible for statistical averages and human experiences to run in opposite directions. A
per capita increase in quantitative factors may take place at the same time as a great qualitative
disturbance in people’s way of life, traditional relationships and sanctions. People may consume
more goods and become less happy or less free at the same time.
(E.P. Thompson 1963, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin: 231)
Abstract Cash transfers are an increasingly important component of social protection systems in most
countries. Usually, cash transfers are evaluated against their effects on poverty or human capital, with their
impact on social relations within and between households relegated to discrete comments on ‘stigma’,
‘resentment’ and sharing, including reduction of remittances and other support. Using evidence from Oxford
Policy Management’s evaluations of cash transfer programmes in Malawi and Zimbabwe, we suggest
reconceptualising cash transfers as ongoing processes of intervention in a complex system of social relations.
Cash transfer interventions operate through and affect this system at each stage: awareness-raising, targeting,
payment, case management and monitoring and evaluation. We conclude that the impact of cash transfers on
social relations is large and often negative. We argue that this is intrinsically important for wellbeing, but can
also have negative consequences for material aspects of wellbeing, such as livelihoods.
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(so that supply responds to additional demand),
these first order effects are positive in the
aggregate, because recipients of cash transfers
by and large spend them on useful goods and
services without significantly reducing their
labour supply. Viewed through this material lens,
cash transfer programmes have received glowing
evaluations (Arnold et al. 2011).
Many evaluations also assess the impact of cash
transfers on social relations within and between
households. Findings are mixed. Some
assessments note positive effects on social capital
(Attanasio et al. 2009), self-confidence and social
status (World Bank 2008), or find that cash
transfers did not increase domestic violence
(Thakur et al. 2009). Although resentment
towards recipients of cash transfers has been
identified (Ellis 2008), negative findings are
normally less commonly presented and are often
constituted as discrete comments on ‘stigma’,
‘resentment’ and sharing, such as reduction of
support, including remittances.
However, impacts of cash transfers on social
relations are far more profound and important
than most assessments discuss. This is for two
reasons.
First, few evaluations examine the impacts on
wellbeing beyond ‘material’ factors (income,
education, etc.). Wellbeing also has ‘relational’ and
‘symbolic’ dimensions, constituted in networks or
status, for instance. These dimensions can be
central to people’s judgements of development
interventions, and can have secondary impacts on
material dimensions, but are rarely central to cash
transfer design or evaluation.
Second, cash transfer programmes not only
provide cash but, like most development
programmes, are pervasive interventions in
people’s lives. They involve many other processes
that affect social relations. These other processes
include initial mobilisation, targeting,
registration, payment, communications and,
often, monitoring and evaluation. These are
rarely examined but are important. For example,
mobilisation that takes place through a specific
individual (such as a chief or health worker) can
imbue that individual with substantial power,
changing their relationship with others.
Alternatively, targeting can cause suspicion and
jealousy and erode shared cultural values. This
directly reduces wellbeing but can also have
secondary impacts on material aspects of
wellbeing if people share less or cooperate less.
We propose a theoretical framework for assessing
impact on non-material dimensions of wellbeing
in the next section, then illustrate these points
with examples from Malawi and Zimbabwe.
2 A framework for the analysis of wellbeing
To analyse ‘non-material’ impacts, we propose a
framework for the analysis of wellbeing. The basic
premise is that wellbeing – the improvement of
which should be the goal of development
interventions – depends on more than just the
possession of or interaction with material objects
or characteristics. It also depends on relations
with people and relations with ideas. This notion
of wellbeing is not universal but local, subjective
and rooted in culture and personal experience
(White and Ellison 2007), and in this sense, tallies
with a ‘rights first’ approach to development that
prioritises local constructions of wellbeing
(Copestake 2007).
Very briefly, this framework includes not only
‘material’ but also ‘relational’ and ‘symbolic’
dimensions. Material dimensions of wellbeing
refer to the types of impacts that are usually
assessed, such as income and basic needs.
Relational dimensions refer to autonomy and
inclusion in social networks and processes.
Symbolic dimensions refer to rights, self-reliance,
status (e.g. the role of the headman may be
elevated by an NGO) and a sense of ‘belonging’.
We join Copestake (2008: 548) to argue that:
analysing [development] programmes solely
with respect to material wellbeing, while
important, can be misleading because it fails
to capture their full meaning to intended
beneficiaries and to other stakeholders. Any
social assistance programme is embedded
within a web of social relationships that is
moulded in turn by strongly held beliefs and
values. These influence how it is perceived by
different stakeholders, how it operates in
practice, scope for its reform and ultimately
its effect on material wellbeing as well.
We now apply this approach to two case studies.
Both have significant non-material impacts, and
greater consideration of these impacts may alter
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evaluative judgements about the programmes.
An analysis of relational impacts allows us to
focus on how cash transfers affect social relations
and to show how these impacts are important
intrinsic components of wellbeing (sometimes
considered just as important as material impacts
by programme participants), as well as having
consequences for material dimensions of
wellbeing. Symbolic impacts are likely to be
important for the legitimacy of programme
implementers, including the government or its
representatives, suggesting a link between cash
transfers and state–citizen relationships (De la
O Torres 2010). Bearing these impacts in mind, a
‘rights first’ approach to development would
imply greater consultation with potential
participants before intervening in their lives.
3 Mchinji Social Cash Transfer (MSCT) Scheme,
Malawi 
The MSCT consists of small regular cash
payments to particularly vulnerable labour-
constrained households, which are selected
through a community process. The goal of the
MSCT is to contribute to national efforts to
reduce poverty and hunger in ultra-poor
households, increase school enrolment and
attendance and improve the health, nutrition,
protection and wellbeing of orphaned and other
vulnerable children. There are thus clear
objectives with respect to material impacts
(health, education, wellbeing and poverty), but
not for relational or symbolic impacts.
Boston University carried out an evaluation of
the Mchinji Scheme in 2007/08 (Miller et al.
2008), consisting of three rounds of quantitative
surveys and a qualitative study. Oxford Policy
Management (OPM) carried out a qualitative
study for the World Bank to compare cash
transfer schemes to social action funds. We
carried out 40 focus groups with men, women,
HIV-positive men and HIV-positive women in ten
communities (Riemenschneider et al. 2008).
Three rounds of a quantitative survey were also
carried out.
Results point in a clear direction of positive
change with respect to material impacts. Survey
findings included improved health, higher
demand for health care, increased expenditure
on education, reduction in child labour,
accumulation of household assets, productive
assets, livestock and improved housing, greater
production and greater food diversity. Focus
group respondents reported improvements in
‘basic needs coverage, human capital
investments, as well as investment in assets and
productive activities’ (Riemenschneider et al.
2008). Boston University’s qualitative evaluation
found the perceived impact among recipients to
be dramatic at times. An HIV-positive mother
said that the transfer allowed her to pay for the
bus fare to the health clinic where she gets free
AIDS medication. Without the transfer she
would be dead and her children would have no
mother, she said. With respect to first order
‘material’ impacts, therefore, the MSCT appears
to have been successful.
The MSCT had no explicit relational objectives
and the impact on social relations is mixed. On
the one hand, aspects of the intervention helped
to improve social relations. There was a ‘greater
willingness to befriend recipients of cash
transfers’, and the programme relieved
‘community members of having to support the
very poor’ (Riemenschneider et al. 2008). On the
other hand, aspects of the targeting procedure
(among other aspects) appear to have affected
social relations negatively in some communities.
The targeting process is elaborate and involves
the community at critical points.
The role of the headman includes signing off the
list of vulnerable and labour-constrained
households that a community Social Protection
Committee has prepared and which is later laid
before the community for approval and then
checked by district authorities. Findings suggest
that there was unease about the involvement of
the headman. Examples of favouritism were cited
by focus group members. This extended even to
committee members: focus group participants felt
that friends and relatives of committee members
were selected, rather than the most vulnerable. A
common view was that support should go directly
to the intended beneficiary to avoid this kind of
problem. Some selected households were said to
have claimed to have orphans to support but in
reality had none. In this way, the MSCT has an
unintended effect on social relations. On the face
of it, the MSCT strengthens the position of the
headman and of committee members while it also
fosters resentment against them. Other cash
transfer programmes avoid the involvement of
community leaders by using ‘objective’ criteria for
targeting (such as age).
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Another concern applies to many targeted cash
transfer schemes: some community members are
chosen, while others are not. In the case of the
MSCT, at a community gathering all households
were ranked according to their vulnerability
status, and the most vulnerable 10 per cent were
selected to receive cash transfers. Targeting
singles out individual households and hence
affects their relations with other households.
Consider the second most vulnerable 10 per cent
of households. They are almost as vulnerable as
the lowest decile, but do not receive the transfers.
There is no obvious solution. A non-targeted
programme is a universal programme, which
either excludes entire non-targeted communities
or (in this case) is about ten times as expensive.
Yet, in an environment where membership of a
collective is more important than individual
advancement, the targeting of individual
households may run counter to the perceptions
of people in the targeted villages. ‘We are all poor’
was a common sentiment among focus group
participants in our research (see also Ellis 2008).
On that basis, the distinction that some received
the benefit while others did not could well have
seemed arbitrary. The resentment and increased
conflict that recipients reported may be a
consequence of this.
These findings suggest that social relations
should be carefully taken into account when
designing, implementing and evaluating cash
transfer schemes.
4 Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer (ZECT)
ZECT was a pilot project implemented by
Concern Worldwide and funded by the World Food
Programme (WFP) that sought to test the
replacement of food aid with an equivalent
amount of cash. ZECT operated for five months
between November 2009 and March 2010,
providing cash only (around US$7 per person),
food only (10 kg cereals, 1.8 kg beans and 0.6
litres oil per person) or a mixture of cash and food
to up to 58,866 individuals on a monthly basis.
The objective of ZECT was principally material
and research-based: to enable households to meet
their food entitlements, to understand market
responses to cash, and to understand community
responses to cash transfers.
ZECT was carefully planned from a technical
point of view. Shortly before the project was
launched, Zimbabwe suffered from hyperinflation
that had catastrophic effects on the economy and
led to the replacement of the Zimbabwean dollar
by the United States dollar. At the same time, the
maize market was deregulated. Markets began to
function better as the economy recovered,
suppliers regained confidence that their goods
would be exchanged for a valuable currency, and
buyers became more accustomed to trust the
currency. Nonetheless, considerable nervousness
about markets remained, and many preferred to
retain large foodstocks rather than sell and rely on
their ability to buy back later. Concern Worldwide
therefore engaged in a careful assessment of the
functioning of local markets before implementing
the cash transfer intervention, and transfers were
made in US dollars.
The following impact results come from an
evaluation conducted by OPM (Kardan et al.
2010), which used participatory methods
(community scoring), focus groups and semi-
structured interviews with recipients, non-
recipients and knowledgeable individuals
(doctors, teachers, chiefs, Concern staff). In
scoring exercises, participants agreed on the size
of impact, and how important this was to them
(out of a score of ten). Evaluation teams visited
three villages (one from each transfer type) in
each of three districts. Results were triangulated
with Concern staff and with Concern’s own
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports.
The provision of cash was broadly successful in
terms of material impacts. Markets worked well,
so recipients were able to use the cash to buy
maize-meal (the main staple) with little
problem. Neither the evaluation nor Concern’s
monitoring identified substantial inflation
caused by the transfer. Supply in local maize
markets increased in response to the transfer.
Kardan et al. (2010: 41) concluded that ‘cash had
the highest impact on staple consumption’.
Participants in scoring found this very important
(ten out of ten). Cash recipients interviewed for
the evaluation reported spending more on health
and education (confirming M&E reports), once
their food needs were met. This was considered
important (9.7 out of 10). Recipients reported
that cash had a small positive impact on the
purchase of basic goods, but that this was not
substantial (5 per cent of cash spending
according to M&E reports), and comparatively
unimportant to them (7 out of 10).
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Set against these positive material impacts were
some more ambiguous relational impacts. The
programme evaluation found that relational
impacts, both within and between households,
were very important to respondents. Intra-
household relations and food consumption were
the only categories to receive a score of ten out
of ten from each focus group in terms of
importance. Community relations were the third
most important category of impact, behind
education and health. This indicates that
relational impacts seem to be just as important
to recipients as material impacts.
The cash transfer appeared to improve relations
within recipient households. Respondents said
that ‘people lived in harmony because there was
enough food in the house’ (Kardan et al. 2010:
50). However, respondents were clear that cash
had negative consequences for relations between
households: ‘when cash was given to recipients,
jealousy brewed easily because people did not
like sharing cash, but there was no hatred when
there was food’ (recipients in Nyanga, cited in
Kardan et al. 2010: 48). The aversion to sharing
cash is a cultural practice, common throughout
the world, and was in contrast to the provision of
food, which had a positive impact on social
relations, because food is usually shared. This
raises important questions for the desirability of
alternative forms of transfer.
Focus group respondents felt the negative impact
of cash on social relations to be intrinsically very
important. Moreover, respondents were clear
that poor relations with their neighbours
subsequently had negative material impacts. For
example, the normal way to deal with temporary
food shortages is to share with neighbours
affected by shocks. However, this relies on good
relations since it is based on trust that the
household will reciprocate. Second, neighbours
share agriculture inputs and this is critical for
production. Third, neighbours share childcare
when household members travel for casual
labour. Fourth, households engage in joint
community work to build shared assets.
It was not only the provision of cash that had
negative consequences for social relations, but
also the process of targeting people (see also
Ellis 2008). Some respondents felt that
community-based targeting – in essence asking
the community to select some and not others –
caused tensions that even led to deaths through
witchcraft, as non-selected households put curses
on recipients. Where food was distributed, this
tension was mitigated because people shared the
food, but this did not occur with cash. Non-
recipients also claimed that the community-
based process led to selection of people with wide
social networks. This is because in practice,
people were selected on the basis of voting for
others who were considered vulnerable. As the
evaluation (Kardan et al. 2010: 72) points out:
The major weakness in this system is that in a
communal setting, it is very hard for
marginalised households to speak freely, and
relatively easy for powerful households to
secure nominations and validations from
those in their social network. This does not
indicate that no vulnerable households are
selected: to the contrary, many are. It does
suggest, however, that some non-vulnerable
households will be included, and some
vulnerable households will be excluded
because they are vulnerable not only
economically but also socially and politically.
This is even more likely to be the case where
villages are strongly divided along political
lines, as was the case in one fieldwork village. 
The dislike of targeting was so strong – and its
negative consequences felt by recipients and
non-recipients alike – that all recipients asked
would have preferred everyone in the village to
receive an equal share, even if this was less than
their current allocation. They preferred to be
less rich, and less resented. This striking finding
is testament to the importance of relational
aspects of wellbeing.
The challenge for policymaking in Zimbabwe is
how to respond to these findings. Concern, in
particular, are juggling a perceived need to
respond to a food emergency with limited
resources, against calls from recipients to make
equal distributions. It is vital to assess whether
the transfers are necessary from a material
humanitarian point of view, before implementing
targeted cash transfers that may damage social
relations.
As with most evaluations, the symbolic impacts
of ZECT were not examined, but several
potential symbolic consequences could have been
explored. First, the decision to switch from food
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to cash was taken with great ‘technocratic care’
(e.g. checking that markets would respond), with
positive consequences in many ways, but without
the involvement of communities. This decision-
making procedure must have contributed to a
feeling that households in this area were not
involved in processes that have important
consequences for their lives. Second, the
targeting process probably strengthened the
symbolic role of the village leaders, as they were
asked to mediate the targeting.
Third, the distribution process made use of the
normal symbols of power to distribute the cash
and food, including schools, NGO personnel and
security officers, and as a result probably
strengthened these institutions. Finally, the
individualisation of people and households (i.e.
individuals in households satisfy their own needs,
and households do not share) raised by the
transfer of cash, may have wider symbolic
consequences. There are anthropological
accounts of the introduction of currency eroding
traditional exchange mechanisms, and in a
similar way, cash transfers may erode rather
than reinforce shared consciousness and activity,
with irreversible negative consequences.
5 Conclusions
Cash transfers leave recipients richer, but
through their various processes also change
people’s relationships. Does this matter? If
development interventions are to be judged by
their impact on wellbeing, and wellbeing is not
only material but also includes the nature of
relationships with other people, institutions and
symbols, then these changes must matter. Cash
transfers are usually designed and evaluated
with a focus on material impacts, with social
relations considered less centrally. This focus, we
have argued, misses important aspects of the
impact of cash transfers.
We have shown that targeting and the
distribution of cash in Zimbabwe has led to
resentment and tension that participants
considered just as significant as having enough
food, and that because of this, they preferred less
cash provided it was delivered equally to
everyone. In Malawi, we have seen that the
mobilisation and targeting processes both
strengthened the position of the headman and
generated substantial resentment.
The need to incorporate non-material impacts
and a process view is not specific to cash
transfers. On the contrary, these approaches
should be applied to all development
interventions. Explicitly considering the views of
participants on non-material impacts does not
make choices simpler or generate unambiguous
conclusions: as the Malawi and Zimbabwe case
studies show, material and relational wellbeing
may pull in opposite directions.
It follows that the current enthusiasm for social
cash transfers should be tempered with some
consideration of impacts on the quality of
people’s relationships. The framework of
material, relational and symbolic aspects of
wellbeing allows us to do this by making explicit
the importance of non-material dimensions of
wellbeing, and by helping to identify the linkages
between different aspects of wellbeing. This
framework should be applied in the design,
implementation and evaluation of all social
protection programmes, to ensure that
judgements about their suitability are based on a
comprehensive assessment of what matters for
improving people’s lives and to avoid, in
Thompson’s words, ‘a great qualitative
disturbance in people’s way of life, traditional
relationships and sanctions’.
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